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THE COURT AND THE CLASSROOM
Laws making it an offense for a seventeen year old to be "idle" or
"immoral" or "disruptive" or "truant" raise very serious questions
about the extent to which young people, as a systematically discrimi-
nated against minority, have been denied equal protection of the law.
Such intolerably vague restrictions . . . represent tenacious efforts of
parents, police and teachers to trap the energies of youth in a grid of
adult expectations that have denied any sense of growth or life. . . . As
Berger says in HAIR they're busted for their beauty!'
This comment explores one particular area where the energies
of youth are meshed into the web of adult expectations-the second-
ary schools. The focus is on the validity of this totalitarian system2
in view of the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression.
It will be seen that only now, as our society approaches its two-
hundredth anniversary, are the courts shifting from recognition of
the states' power to compel conformity into a new and genuine con-
cern for full, affirmative protection of the student's right to express
his beliefs.
TODAY'S YOUTH AND THEIR SCHOOLS
The high school students of today are the youth who witnessed
the fervent hope for a free and open society that was born with the
Civil Rights movement of the 1960's. Yet, in their short span of
life, they have seen the assassinations of three national leaders who
embodied this promise of democracy for all. Today, war is for them
more than another television shoot 'em up enjoyed during the eve-
ning meal. It is a frightening reality as the Doomsday of draft age
approaches. Still young themselves, they have watched the nation
shift from the youthful sense of unlimited expectations to the middle
age habit of assessing and conserving old strengths and former gains.
Fed by the mass media, urged by parents and teachers to in-
quire, the students of today are sensitive to this larger world-as no
other generation. Yet, for them, the typical school environment-
with its goal of producing competent college board test takers, with
its student council that fullfills its social duty by planning proms,
with its newspaper that highlights class elections and football games
-is totally inept for developing awareness and compassion for the
world of real life.
Not only does the typical school system stifle the student's
sensitivity to society, but it inhibits awareness of the inner world
of self. As an able commentator has written:
1 Savoy, Toward A New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 44 (1970).
2 L PArrsasoN, Tim GOD OF THE MACHINE 272 (1964).
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In adolescence they are trying to realize and clarify their identity;
the school acting as a mobility ladder, assumes instead the function of
inducing them to change or alter it. They want to discover who they
are; the school wants to help them "make something of themselves."
They want to know who they are; the school wants to help them get
somewhere. They want to learn what is right for them; the school
wants to teach them to give responses that will earn them rewards in
the classroom or social situation.3
The assertion that today's typical educational system stifles
personal and social awareness is perhaps best illustrated by the reac-
tion of local school boards to high school underground newspapers.
Thirteen students from Long Beach High in New York City sought
permission to distribute their fledgling newspaper, Frox, on the
campus. The written request to the school board included promises
"to refrain from obscenity" and "to publish views in opposition to
our own."4 Standing squarely for freedom of expression, the local
board responded: "It is the aim of our high schools to encourage
students to freely express themselves, in writing or otherwise, as
part of their educational experience." 5 The board followed its
policy of encouraging expression by feeling "compelled" to refuse
the request to distribute Frox. The board added that disciplinary
action was forthcoming if the students flaunted the decision.6
In San Jose, California, the Campbell Union High School Dis-
trict banned the student published Del Mar Free Press which pre-
sented a pot-pourri of social and political commentary. The school
district maintained that it had the right to control the ideas children
are exposed to while in school." "The molecular structure of the
students' minds will be disturbed if confronted with outside ideas
covered by the newspapers." 8
John Freedberg, a student in a Seattle high school was a con-
sistent honor student, one of three chosen by the faculty as "out-
standing students." Three months before graduation, John was
suspended for editing and publishing a mimeographed newspaper
which expressed opposition to "the war" as well as to adult reaction
to long hair. Ironically, in his junior year, Mr. Freedberg was se-
lected regional winner of the Veterans of Foreign Wars' essay con-
test "What Democracy Means to Me."9
8 E. FtE ENBECR, Commo op AcE mN AmERICA, 170 (1965).
4 Divoky, Revolt In The High Schools-The Way Its Going To Be, SAT. Rzv.,
Feb. 15, 1969, at 83.
5 Id.
0 Id.
7 A three judge panel of the United States Federal District Court in San Fran-
cisco, California, recently struck down the school's contention in Rowe v. Campbell
Union High School District.
s San Jose Mercury, April 14, 1970, Part B, at 16, Col. 1.
9 Divoky, Revolt In The High Schools-The Way Its Going To Be, SAT. Rzv.,
Feb. 1 , 1969, at 87.
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The grooming codes of the high school world are, of course, but
another reflection of the regulations which stifle student expression
and exploration.1" This comment, having alluded to the repressive
and stifling nature of secondary education will now explore the
remedies which the first amendment provides for the student who
seeks to explore and assert his social and personal consciousness in
the face of inhibiting restrictions on student behavior.
EDUCATION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY
Conflicts over the validity of school regulations date back at
least to 1870.11 These early cases held that the courts had no juris-
diction over the internal operations of the states' school systems.1
2
Because the courts were reluctant to intervene, the power of the
state in the field of education was, in effect, absolute. This attitude
of judicial non-intervention began to subside when, in the 1920's,
some benches recognized that the courts have a legitimate function
in reviewing state education regulations. However, even in such
"progressive" jurisdictions the power of the state to control the
school environment was, in effect, unimpeded. These courts held
that if there was any reasonable relation between the rule and a
legitimate educational purpose, the regulation was valid."
The plenary power of the state was so thoroughly accepted that
the issue of the applicability of constitutional guarantees was not
even raised in these early cases.' 4 Constitutional litigation was dis-
couraged even at the university level by a judicial attitude that
attendance at a public institution was a privilege which might be
10 Farber, The Student As Nigger, L.A. Free Press, March 3, 1967, at 8, col. 21.
"Then there is the infamous code of dress! In some high schools if your skirt looks
too short, you have to kneel before the principal, in a brief allegory of fallatio. If
the hem doesn't reach the floor, you go home to change. Boys in high school can't
be too sharp. You'd think the school board would be delighted to see all the spades
trooping to school in party shoes, suits and ties. Uh-uh, they're too visible."
11 See Hodgkins v. Rockport, 105 Mass. 475 (1870). Hodgkins held that the
court has no jurisdiction to review the acts, in good faith, of the school board in
matters affecting discipline. The court let stand the expulsion of a boy whose behavior
was "[N]ot mutinous or gross . . .but consisted of .. .carelessness of posture in his
seat . . . [and] tricks of playfulness . . . . Id. at 475.
12 Watson v. Cambridge, 157 Mass. 561, 32 N.E. 864 (1893); Bishop v. Inhabi-
tants of Rowley, 165 Mass. 460, 43 N.E. 191 (1896).
13 Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923) (eighteen year old
girl expelled for wearing talcum powder on her face); Tanton v. McKenny, 226 Mich.
245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924) (college student suspended for criticizing disciplinary mea-
sures in the public press).
14 Morrison v. Lawrence, 186 Mass. 456, 72 N.E. 91 (1904) (student suspended
for writing letter to newspaper critical of school authorities) ; State ex. rel. Dresser
v. Bd. of School Dist. No. 1, 155 Wisc. 619, 116 N.W. 232 (1908) (student suspended
for satirical poem about school rules).
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conditioned on the waiver of constitutional liberties.15 A typical
statement of this attitude appears in an old Illinois decision uphold-
ing the regulation requiring student attendance at weekly chapel
services:
By voluntarily entering the university, or being placed there by those
having the right to control him, he necessarily surrenders very many
of his individual rights. How this time shall be occupied; what his
habits shall be; his general deportment; ...his hours of study and
recreation-in all these matters, and many others, he must yield obe-
dience to those who, for the time being, are his masters .... 16
In 1943, the decision of Board of Education v. Barnette17 in-
dicated that the courts were at long last willing to accord some
constitutional protection to high school students. In Barnette, stu-
dents challenged a state statute which compelled pupils to salute
the American flag in a prescribed manner.'" The petitioners alleged
that the regulation abridged their freedom to worship in that their
religious beliefs forbade homage to temporal objects. In addressing
the issue of whether courts could and should intervene when liberty
in public secondary schools is threatened, Mr. Justice Jackson,
speaking for the Court, said: "We cannot, because of modest esti-
mates of our competence in such specialties as public education,
withhold the judgment that history authenticates as the function of
this Court when liberty is infringed."' 9 The decision continued:
School boards have important, delicate, and highly discretionary func-
tions, but none that they may not perform within the Bill of Rights.
That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scru-
pulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we
are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.
20
This sweeping language, on its face, strongly supports the
proposition that high school students are thoroughly protected by
the first amendment. Yet, Barnette was destined to mean little more
15 Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (The Court
upheld the dismissal of members of a religious group who refused to participate in
military training).
16 North v. Bd. of Trustees, 137 Ill. 296, 306. 27 N.E. 54, 56 (1891). In Tinker
v. Des Moines Ind. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) and W. Va. Bd. of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the Court narrowly interpreted Hamilton and
related cases. It rejected arguments that the Court accepted the doctrine that atten-
dance at a public secondary institution may be conditioned on a waiver of consti-
tutional rights.
17 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
18 A stiff arm salute was required. The saluter raised his right hand with palm
turned upward, a style peculiarly analogous to a salute favored by the Fascist states
of Europe.
19 319 U.S. 624, 638-40 (1943).
20 Id. at 637.
19.701
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than educational regulations may be struck down when violative of
the free exercise and establishment clauses.2'
Within a year of Barnette, the same high court decided Prince
v. Massachusetts22 and dealt with the specific issue of the right to
exercise religious convictions in the face of child labor laws. Here
the Supreme Court said that, even where there is an invasion of
protected freedoms, ". . . the power of the state to control the con-
duct of children reaches beyond its powers over adults .... 2 Al-
though the case did not involve the rights of students in the secondary
school environment, Prince's significance was that it held that
children are not equals under the first amendment. The lower courts
took Prince as a cue authorizing continued state treatment of
school children as second class citizens. Subsequent decisions held
that the primary freedom in public schools was that of school ad-
ministrators from judicial interference. Expounding the pre-Barnette
rationale, state restrictions on student conduct were upheld if there
was any reasonable relation between the regulation and a legitimate
educational purpose. Under this reasonable relation test, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court in Leonard v. School Committee24 upheld
the suspension of a pupil for failure to comply with the board's rule
regarding the "proper" length of hair. After paying lip service to the
concept of student rights, the court cited the reasonable relation test
and held in favor of the state, commenting:
[T]he unusual hair style of the plaintiff could disrupt and impede the
maintenance of a proper classroom atmosphere or decorum .... [A]ny
unusual, immodest, or exaggerated mode of dress or conspicuous de-
partures from accepted customs in the matter of haircuts could result
in the distraction of other pupils.
25
In view of the long line of cases on the matter, it was quite
reasonable for one commentator to conclude, in 1968, that secondary
students are not, by law, proper subjects for constitutional protec-
tion, including those first amendment protections in the area of
26expression.
21 See Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engle v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
22 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
23 Id. at 170.
24 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965). The most recent case cited was Anteli
v. Stokes, 287 Mass. 103, 191 N.E. 407 (1934), which upheld a ban on secret frater-
nities.
25 Id. at 709-10, 212 N.E.2d at 472 [emphasis added]. Cf. Raywid, The Great
Haircut Crisis of Our Time, 48 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 150, 153 (1966), where the author,
a teacher, suggests that something may be wrong with any teacher whose classroom
control breaks down over a haircut and odd clothes.
26 Comment, Developments-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 1045 (1968).
[Vol. I1I
COMMENTS
TINKER V. DES MOINES INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
Finally, in February of 1969, the law took a significant step
toward affirmative extension of constitutional guarantees to high
school students. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dis-
trict 7 the Supreme Court, for the first time, upheld the position of
a high school student solely on a freedom of expression basis. In
Tinker, primary and secondary students sought injunctive relief
against enforcement of a rule prohibiting the wearing of armbands
while on campus. The challenged regulation was promulgated in
response to information that students planned to wear black arm-
bands to protest the Vietnam War.
The claimed personal right was that of symbolic speech while
the state claimed plenary power to regulate student conduct. Speak-
ing through Mr. Justice Fortas, the Court ruled in favor of the
students. Tinker explicitly held: that the power of the state to regu-
late education is not absolute;2 that young people do not forfeit
those fundamental liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights merely
because of their status as students; 29 and, that students are very
much entitled to constitutional protection of freedom of expression. 0
Resurrecting Barnette, the Court said:
It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
Constitutional rights to freedom of speech at the school house gate.
• . . In our system, state operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism. . . .Students in school as well as out of school are
"4persons" . . . possessed of fundamental rights which the state must
respect. . . .In our system, students may not be regarded as closed
circuit recipients of only that which the state chooses to communicate.
They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments which
are officially approved .... 81
Thus, the Tinker court clearly recognized that the Constitution
does in fact protect the high school student in his exercise of sym-
bolic expression. Yet, in spite of the sweeping language on student
rights and the first amendment, Tinker is limited by its facts. Justice
Fortas excluded from the decision the most controversial areas of
student exercise of non-vocal expression, stating: "The problem
posed by the present case does not relate to the regulation of length
of skirts or type of clothing, to hair style or deportment."3 2 Neverthe-
less, the lower courts are construing Tinker as a mandate to extend
27 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
28 Id. at S07.
29 Id. at 511.
80 Id. at S06.
a Id. at 511.
82 Id. at S07.
1970]
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the first amendment's guarantees to all areas of non-vocal, non-
intimidating expression.
AFTERMATH OF TINKER
The Extent of a High School Student's Freedom of Expression-
Symbolic Expression and the Press
Today, in the aftermath of Tinker, the legal system is moving
to accord full judicial protection to the right of high school students
to symbolically communicate ideas. It is, of course, well established
that symbolic expression is a right entitled to first amendment pro-
tection. As stated in O'Brien v. United States:" "[I] t has long been
recognized that symbolic expression may be protected speech.) 34
Tinker's significance in the area of symbolic expression is that the
right of symbolic expression is now recognized to extend to the
student in his educational environment. Although Tinker held that
students have the right to symbolically communicate an idea, the
Court failed to set a standard for determining what constitutes sym-
bolic expression.
Unfortunately, other free speech decisions have likewise ne-
glected to articulate a guideline for finding symbolic expression. The
question has instead been resolved on a case by case basis. However,
a careful reading of these cases suggests that courts find symbolic
expression when communication is accomplished by passive, yet as-
sertive, non-verbal conduct. In Stromberg v. California,35 where the
court held that the display of a red flag was symbolic expression,
the communication-opposition to the established government-was
accomplished by the non-verbal conduct of displaying a red flag. In
Board of Education v. Barnette,6 where the court held that the
refusal to salute the flag was symbolic conduct, the communication
-that the law of God is superior to the laws of temporal government
-was accomplished by the non-verbal conduct of refusing to salute
the flag. In O'Brien v. United States, 87 where the burning of a draft
card was recognized as symbolic expression, the communication-
the draft and the war are illegal and immoral-was accomplished by
the non-verbal conduct of burning a draft card. In Tinker, the com-
munication-the War is immoral-was accomplished by the non-
verbal conduct of the wearing of black armbands.8" Such decisions
3 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967).
34 Id. at 541. See also Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), and Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 236 (1965).
35 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
86 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
87 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967).
38 See also Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1968); Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229 (1963); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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infer, then, that symbolic expression is defined as communication
accomplished by passive, yet assertive, non-verbal conduct.
Today, the question of symbolic expression in the school is
most often raised regarding long hair and unconventional dress. If
symbolic expression may be defined as communication accomplished
by means of non-verbal conduct, as suggested above, such uncon-
ventional appearance is arguably expression protected by the first
amendment. Shaggy hair and nonconforming clothes may be a non-
verbal means of communicating hostility towards the school ad-
ministration, or a non-verbal means of communicating rejection of
traditional views and values of society. Thus, because shaggy hair
and freaky clothes may communicate by non-verbal conduct, such
conduct is, by the proposed definition, symbolic expression pro-
tected by the first amendment.
This argument finds support in Richards v. Thurston.89 Here,
a student was suspended on the sole ground that he refused to have
his hair cut "in a tidy style that Albert Einstien as a scholar or
master rarely displayed."4 Although the court ruled for the student
on other grounds, it noted that the right to wear one's hair as he
pleases might be described as one of the aspects of freedom of ex-
pression: The court then said: "[This] is the right symbolically to
indicate his association with some of the younger generation in ex-
pressing their independent aesthetic and social outlook and their
determination to reject many of the customs and values of the older
generation.'
Some decisions entirely avoid the issue of whether long hair
or unconventional dress is symbolic expression. Instead, these courts
simply hold that a student's choice of appearance is a highly pro-
tected right under the Constitution. 2
39 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969). This opinion includes the statement: "This
court takes judicial notice that hair styles have altered from time to time throughout
the ages. Samson's locks symbolically signified his virility. Many of the Founding
Fathers of this country wore wigs. President Lincoln grew a beard at the suggestion
of a female admirer. Chief Justice Hughes' beard furnished the model for the frieze
over the portico of the Supreme Court of the United States proclaiming equal justice
under the law! Today many of both the younger and older generations have avoided
the increased cost of barbering by allowing their locks or burnsides to grow to greater
lengths than when a haircut cost a quarter of a dollar." Id. at 451.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 455.
42 See Sims v. Colfax Community School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Iowa
1970); Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969); Breen v. Kahl, 296
F. Supp. 102 (W.D. Wis. 1969). See also Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D.
Vt. 1970), where the court said: "The cut of one's hair is more fundamental to per-
sonal appearance than the type of clothing he wears. Garments can be changed at
will whereas hair, once it is cut, has to remain constant for substantial periods of
time. In addition to manifesting basic personality traits, hair style has been shadowed
19101
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In Griffin v. Tatum,43 which involved the issue of a student's
right to wear long hair, the court stated:
Although there is disagreement over the proper analytical framework,
there can be little doubt that the Constitution protects the freedom to
determine one's own hair and otherwise to govern one's personal ap-
pearance. Indeed, the exercise of these freedoms is highly important
in preserving the vitality of our traditional concepts of personality
and individuality. . . . [T]his court finds and concludes that the im-
position of the hair length rule to this plaintiff to the point of sup-
pression infringes upon fundamental substantive liberties . . .44
It is, then, unsettled whether the wearing of long hair and noncon-
forming dress is symbolic speech entitled to first amendment pro-
tection.45
Today, however, the trend is definitely toward full judicial
recognition of the right of the high school student to symbolically
assert his beliefs. Tinker and the earlier decision of Burnside v.
Byars48 firmly establish that the wearing of armbands, political
buttons and analogous symbols by the student is entitled to first
amendment protection. 47 A recent decision indicates that the courts
are willing to fully apply the right of symbolic expression to high
school students. In Frain v. Baron,8 students refused to stand and
pledge allegiance to the flag in ceremonies at the beginning of the
school day. These refusals were not based on religious grounds as in
Barnette, but on the basis that the phrase "with liberty and justice
for all" is not true in America today. One student testified: "As for
the pledge: I believe it is untrue and I refuse to swear to a lie."149
The court, in accordance with the trend towards full protection of
student rights held that the state's attempt to coerce participation,
with political, philosophical and ideological overtones and as such has been afforded
a measure of the protection given these underlying beliefs." Id. at 419.
43 300 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Ala. 1969).
44 Id. at 62.
45 For an analysis of the right to wear long hair in school regarding the Fourth,Eighth and Ninth Amendments see Davis v. Ferment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La.
1967). See also Browles v. Bradley Co. Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Tenn.1970), where the court upheld a student dress code regulating the length of hair over
petitioner's assertion the regulation violated his fourth amendment right to privacy.
For a decision striking down a dress code on a fourteenth amendment, equal protec-
tion concept See Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970).
46 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966). See also Aquiree v. Tahoka Ind. School Dist.,
311 F. Supp 664 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
47 Courts will not of course, examine a regulation on a first amendment basisif the petitioner does not assert that his first amendment rights were violated. See
Lovelace v. Leechburg Area School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Penn. 1970);Schwartz v. Galveston Ind. School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 1034 (S.D. Texas 1970);
Livingston v. Swagquist, 314 F. Supp. I (N.D. IMI. 1970).
48 307 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
49 Id. at 29.
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by excluding non-participating students from the area in which the
ceremonies were held, was unconstitutional. The court, citing Brown
v. Louisiana50 and Tinker, held that the Constitution's protection
of non-verbal expression applied to these students. Thus, even the
student's right to exercise symbolic expression in the form of active
conduct, as distinguished from the passive wearing of symbols, is
sometimes protected by the first amendment.
As the courts move to accord full constitutional protection to
the right to symbolically communicate expression, the courts are
likewise recognizing the right of students to disseminate ideas in
the press. The initial decision for the recognition of the first amend-
ment rights of students to utilize the official high school press is
Zucker v. Panitz.15 Here, the school newspaper solicited advertise-
ments and was otherwise a forum for expression. Basing its decision
on the first and fourteenth amendments, Zucker upheld the right of
the student petitioners to publish paid advertisements denouncing
the war in Vietnam. Zucker's implication is, of course, quite clear-
a student newspaper must be open to all viewpoints, not solely to
the opinions of those in control.
The first amendment rights of students to publish and distribute
underground newspapers is likewise being established. In Sullivan v.
Houston Independent School District,52 students edited and pub-
lished an off-campus newspaper critical of school officials and their
policies. Ostensibly, the students were suspended because the papers
appeared in classrooms causing interruptions in class procedure. The
court, after finding that the interruptions were minor and few in
number, ordered reinstatement of those suspended. Noting that the
conduct was first amendment activity in its purest form, Sullivan
held that the constitutional right of free speech includes the rights
of students to publish and distribute off-campus newspapers. Sullivan
further ruled that distribution may occur on school premises so long
as it does not unreasonably interfere with school activities.
Apparently noting Sullivan's recognition of the right to publish
and distribute off-campus newspapers, a Connecticut school district
enacted a regulation requiring administrative approval before litera-
ture was distributed on school grounds. In Eisner v. Stamford Board
of Education,5" the District Court struck down the measure on the
basis that such a regulation is "... a classic example of prior re-
50 383 U.S. 131 (1968).
51 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
52 307 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
3 314 F. Supp. 832 (D. Conn. 1970).
19701
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straint of speech and press which constitutes a violation of the First
Amendment .. .
Limitations on the Exercise of Protected Expression-Tinker's
"Material and Substantial Disruption" Test
In view of the preceding discussion of Tinker and subsequent
decisions, it is evident that the legal system is overcoming its past
reluctance to extend the right of freedom of expression to high
school students. However, the secondary student's right to free ex-
pression is, like the adult's right to free expression," subject to
limitation.
Against a sweeping declaration of the high school student's
rights under the first amendment, the Tinker Court acknowledged
the need for limited state control of expressive conduct in the public
schools. The Court noted that free speech is subject to reasonable
restrictions as to time, place, manner and duration. Tinker recog-
nized that where the student, in the exercise of first amendment
rights, collides with the rules of the school authorities, the law must
balance the competing interests.56 In announcing the point at which
the scale tips in favor of the regulation of expression, the Court
said:
[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason-
whether it stems from time, place or type of behavior-materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others, is ... not immunized by the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of speech. 57
Thus, although a student's expression is a recognized first
amendment right, whether a student's exercise of this right is pro-
tected depends upon Tinker's material and substantial interference
test. Unfortunately, Tinker's application of this standard was lim-
ited to the unique factual situation of black armbands. As a result
there is today no definite guide for determining when expressive
activity constitutes a material and substantial disruption of the
educational process. At this time, then, the issue must be resolved
solely on a case by case basis. However, Tinker and the few cases
on student rights that follow Tinker do provide a basic guide for
determining when expressive conduct cannot, by constitutional stand-
ards, materially and substantially interfere with the process of
54 Id. at 834. See also Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 44 (1938); Near v. Minnesota
ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
55 See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965) ; Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965).
56 393 U.S. 503, 512-13.
57 Id. at 513.
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education. The guideline indicated by these cases falls into the fol-
lowing categories:
1) "Speech" expressing opinions on highly controversial issues
facing society. Tinker firmly establishes the rule that the educa-
tional establishment may not restrict student speech merely because
it expresses opinions on issues which face the general society. The
prohibition exists even when the subject matter of the speech in-
volves highly controversial issues. The Court said that the student
".. . may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like
the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without 'materially and sub-
stantially' interfering with appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school.""8
2) Expression critical of school administration and regulations.
Schwartz v. Schuker59 indicates that expression which is critical of
school administration and school regulations is not, in itself, a "sub-
stantial and material" interference with the educational process.60
In Schwartz, a student's suspension was related to his publication
and distribution of a newspaper criticizing the principal as "a big
liar" and a "racist." The Court, citing Cox v. State of Louisiana6
noted that "... there is no constitutional right to suppress or censor
speech or expression even though it may be hateful or offensive to
those in authority or opposed by the majority.)
6 2
3) Apprehension of the breakdown of authority. Apprehension
that the school's authority will be undermined by allowing students
to exercise rights of non-vocal expression was rejected as a basis for
limiting student expression in Griffin v. Tatum.63 Here, school au-
thorities expressed a fear that school discipline would be seriously
curtailed if the court ruled in favor of allowing the students to
58 Id.
59 298 F. Supp. 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (dictum).
60 See also Sullivan v. Houston Ind. School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex.
1969). For a discussion of the right of an adult to distribute controversial political
literature on a high school campus, See Mandel v. Municipal Court for Oakland-
Piedmont Jud. Dist., 26 A.C.A. 788, 81 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1969).
61 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
62 298 F. Supp. 238, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). The human propensity to curb un-
wanted criticism has long been noted by the theorists of freedom of expression. Thus,
John Stuart Mill, early in his essay ON LIBERTY, remarked: "The disposition of man-
kind, whether as rulers or as fellow citizens, to impose their own opinions and inclina-
tions as a rule of conduct on others is so energetically supported by some of the best
and some of the worst feelings incident to human nature that it is hardly ever kept
under restraint by anything but want of power; and as the power is not declining
but growing, unless a strong barrier of moral conviction can be raised against the
mischief, we must expect, in the present circumstances of the world, to see it increase."
J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 18 (Liberal Arts Press 1956).
W 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
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"cultivate indecent hair styles. '6 4 Griffin ruled that such an appre-hension does not justify a restriction of student rights. The courtfurther noted that such an argument can be made in favor of any
school rule and if accepted would effectively eliminate the concept
of student expression. Chief Judge Johnson added: "So far as the
education of young people is concerned it is important for them to
appreciate the present vitality of our proud tradition that although
we respect government in the exercise of Constitutional powers, wejealously guard our freedom from all attempts to exercise uncon-
stitutional powers."6
4) Apprehension of disruption. Administrative apprehension
that some students might take physical action against students who
express conflicting views is not a valid basis for a finding of a ma-
terial and substantial disruption of the educational process. Griffin,
citing Cooper v. Aaron,66 said: "This court recognizes that the
threat of mob violence is no excuse for the failure of the court...
to protect the Constitutional rights of private citizens." '
Akin to this rule of Griffin is the concept expressed in Tinker
that fear of general disorder is not a ground for limiting a student'speaceful exercise of first amendment rights. The Tinker Court said:
"Any word spoken in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus,
that deviates from the views of another person, may start an argu-
ment or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take
this risk."" It may, then, be said that tolerance of the unrest in-
trinsic to expression is constitutionally required even in the schools.
THE TROUBLE WITH TINKER
There are, then, judicial guidelines for determining when ex-pression cannot be found to materially and substantially interfere
with the process of education. However, the fact remains that thereis no definite standard for determining when expressive activity does
materially and substantially interfere with the educational process.
If this standard is allowed to remain in its present nebulous state,
then the secondary student's right of expression is forever threat-
ened.
This danger is well illustrated by Scoville v. Board of Educa-
tion." Here, two students were expelled for distributing a publica-
04 Id. at 63.
65 Id.
e6 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
07 300 F. Supp. 60, 63 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
08 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
09 415 F2d 860 (7th Cir. 1969). This is the advance sheet citation of the case.
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tion entitled Grass High. Grass High contained poetry, essays, movie
and record reviews. Included was an editorial written in response
to the school administration's pamphlet which explained the function
of the school and attendance regulations. The editorial criticized the
pamphlet's value and urged students to refuse to accept or destroy
"all propaganda" published by the school. Then, ". . . the utterly
idiotic and asinine procedure parents must go through to assure that
their children will be excused for their absences"70 was attacked.
The editorial continued with an accusation that the senior dean had
a "sick mind" and concluded with the observation that ". . . our
whole system of education with all its arbitrary rules and schedules
seems dedicated to nothing but wasting time."'"
As a result of the publication of Grass High, the two editors
were expelled for the remainder of the school year. The expelled
students brought suit for injunctive relief charging that the dis-
ciplinary action violated their right of free expression. The District
Court ruled the students' action amounted to a material and sub-
stantial disruption of the educational process and as such was not
entitled to first amendment protection. This decision was rendered
in spite of the fact that there were no allegations that the distribu-
tion of Grass High caused any disturbances, commotion or disrup-
tion of classes i
By the Seventh Circuit's 1969 standards, Webster's Third New
International Dictionary is obviously mistaken in its definition of
the terms "material" and "substantial." According to Webster "ma-
terial" means "... of great consequence . . .,72 and "substantial"
means "... real, true . . . ." In view of the application of the
Tinker test to the facts of Scoville and the resultant decision, the
Seventh Circuit had other definitions in mind.
Scoville most certainly illustrates the threat to the high school
student's right to expression presented by the present, undefined
meaning of the material and substantial disruption standard .7  Per-
The court reconsidered its action and granted plaintiff's petition for a rehearing en
banc. Its prior decision was reversed in Scoville v. Bd. of Educ. of Joliet, 425 F.2d 10
(7th Cir. 1970).
70 415 F.2d 860, 863.
71 Id.
72 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 1392 (1966).
73 Id. at 2280.
74 Scoville does not stand alone in its questionable application of the Tinker
standard. See Gfell v. Rickelman, 313 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ohio 1970), where the court
upheld a school rule regulating the length of hair on the basis that it prevented safety
hazards, led to the maintainance of discipline and order, and aided in the teaching
of "proper" growing discipline and etiquette! See also Corley v. Daunhauer, 312 F.
Supp. 811 (E.D. Arks. 1970), where the court upheld a school rule regulating the
length of hair for band members on the basis that bands are characterized by regimen-
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haps Tinker's test is, as are so many judicial tests, not amenable to
further clarification and, as such, must remain subject to a case by
case interpretation. However, as a result of Tinker's vagueness, stu-
dent rights are forever threatened by de facto conspiracies of those
student administrators and judges who seek to suppress free ex-
pression in the high schools.
That there are administrators who seek to suppress such ex-
pression may surely be inferred from the numerous cases which face
the issue of restrictions on student conduct. That there are jurists
who feel that student expression is undesirable and who, as a result,
will deny the right to such conduct is perhaps most clearly illustrated
by Stevenson v. Wheeler County Board of Education.75 Here the
court said:
Among the things a student is supposed to learn in school . . . is a
sense of discipline .... By accepting an education at public expense
pupils at the elementary or high school level subject themselves to
considerable discretion on the part of the school authorities as to the
manner in which they deport themselves. Those who run the schools
should be the judges in such matters not the courts. The quicker
judges get out of the business of running schools the better .... 76
Our courts and, indeed, our society must reject the attitude of
Stevenson. We cannot abandon the schools to those administrators
who will oppress expression, even that expression which is purely
symbolic. 77 To allow oppression of such speech is to encourage the
existence of an academic vacuum, an environment void of the ex-
change of views and the interplay of ideas7 -an environment deny-
ing the opportunity for full personal growth.79 To tolerate oppression
of speech, merely because the speech occurs in the schools, is to tie
tation and as such are no place for individual exhibitionists. But see Dunham v.
Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970).
75 306 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
76 Id. at 101.
77 See Philadelphia Gazette, Nov. 17, 1737, quoted in L. LEAvY, LEGACY OF SuP-
PRESSION, 135 (1960), where an editorial commenting on the trial of John Peter Zenger
noted: "These abuses of Freedom of Speech [sic] are the excesses of Liberty [sic.].
They ought to be suppressed; but to whom do we commit the case of doing it? An
evil Magistrate [sic], entrusted with the power to punish words [sic] is armed with
a Weapon [sic] the most destructive and terrible. Under the pretense of pruning off
the exuberant branches, he frequently destroys the tree."
78 See Sweat v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
79 See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), where the court said,
"The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas'. The nation's future depends
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues [rather] than through any kind of
authoritarian selection." Id. at 603. See also J. MILTON, AEROPAcITICA 21 (Everyman's
ed. 1927) where Milton commenting on restraints on expression said: "It is the




the cloak of dull conformity around our youth. 0 To allow suppres-
sion of speech in the schools is to clog that safety valve that free
expression provides."' To allow oppression of responsible student
expression is to deny that right which is the foundation stone of the
Bill of Rights-the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by
the first amendment. And, indeed, to deny freedom of expression
is to deny one of the basic tenets of our society. 2 As aptly stated
by Mr. Justice Holmes in 1919:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foun-
dation of their conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade of ideas-that the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,
and that truth is the only ground upon which their work can be safely
carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution.
83
Indeed, then, it is imperative that the courts strictly construe
the material and substantial disruption test of Tinker against re-
strictions on student expression. "That they are educating our young
for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind
at its source and teach the young to discredit important principles
of government as mere platitudes."
8 4
TINKER'S IMPLICATIONS
How are the courts to meet the expressed necessity of fully pro-
tecting peaceful, orderly and effective expression while at the same
time insuring that the school is able to fulfill its function of edu-
80 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), where Mr. Justice McReynolds
expressed this society's repudiation of the principle that a state might conduct its
schools so as to foster a homogenous people. He said: "In order to submerge the
individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the males at seven into bar-
racks and training to official guardians. Although such measures have been deliber-
ately approved by men of great genius, their ideas touching on the relation between
the individual and the state are wholly different from those upon which our institu-
tions rest: and, it will hardly be affirmed that our Legislature could impose such
restrictions upon the people of a state without doing violence to both letter and spirit
of the Constitution." Id. at 402.
81 See Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Education, 314 F. Supp. 832 (D. Conn. 1970),
where the court said: "In part, the First Amendment acts as a 'safety valve' and
tends to decrease the resort to violence by frustrated citizens." See also, Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) and Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
82 The right of the individual to freedom of expression has deep roots in our
history. The concept as we know it today is essentially a product of the great intel-
lectual and social movement beginning with the Renaissance which transformed the
Western world from a feudal and authoritarian society to one whose faith rested
upon the dignity, reason and freedom of the individual. See Z. CHAFFE, FREE SPEECH
IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1941).
83 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Dissenting opinion).
84 West Va. Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
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cating the young within the traditional curriculum? This comment
submits that a careful analysis of the language and facts of Tinker,
itself, provides a very definite guide for resolving the problem
"... where students in their exercise of First Amendment rights
collide with the rules of school authorities."85
As previously discussed, Tinker protects expression in class and
out, until that time when it ". . . materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.18 6
There are decisions involving the issue of the right to symbolically
express an idea which might indicate that Tinker gave judges free
discretion to determine when symbolic expression materially inter-
fered with schoolwork."7 Tinker, however, said that it is difficult, if
not impossible, for a court to justify a finding that mere symbolic
expression, unaccompanied by other expressive conduct, materially
hampers classroom and school functions. Tinker cited with definite
approval Burnside v. Byars8 which decided the issue of the right
of black students to symbolically communicate criticism of segrega-
tion and racism in the State of Mississippi. In spite of the tension
created by the wearing of buttons advocating integration during a
period of severe racial disturbances, the District Court held the ex-
pression was protected.
The court said that it does not seem likely that pure symbolic
expression, unaccompanied by other conduct, would ever hamper
the schools in carrying out its activities. Symbolic expression, Burn-
side noted, ".... is certainly not in the class of those activities which
inherently distract students and break down the regimentation of
the classroom." 9 Tinker, then, by its recurring approval of Burnside
holds that pure symbolic expression-buttons, armbands, long hair,
unconventional dress, medallions-enjoys virtual absolute consti-
tutional protection where the form of the expression is not obscene.90
In cases where the asserted right to expression involves more
than pure symbolic expression, the place where the conduct occurs
weighs heavily in the result. States, through their school boards,
may legitimately prohibit such active expression in the classroom
itself. Such conduct may be a material disruption of and bring sub-
stantial disorder to instruction where free expression of thought is
not considered beneficial to the traditional, structured learning
process. As Tinker noted, through Burnside, expression which in-
85 Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
86 Id. at 507.
87 See note 74 supra.
88 363 F.2d 744 (Sth Cir. 1966).
89 Id. at 748.
90 Cf. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
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herently disturbs students and breaks down the regimentation of
classwork ". .. carrying banners, scattering leaflets, speechmaking
-has no place in the orderly classroom."'"
Where the asserted right to expression involves more than pure
symbolic expression and takes place away from the immediate class-
room area, students are constitutionally protected in many forms of
expression. Tinker recognized that an important part of the school's
function is to accommodate personal intercommunication among the
students. As such, the student's rights do not embrace merely the
classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field,
or on the campus during authorized hours, he may express his
opinions." This right vanishes only when the limits of the Tinker
standard are reached. But, what is the guide for determining when
the expression ". . . involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others"?" The answer lies in the application of the law,
facts and principles of analogous Supreme Court decisions to cases
involving student right to expression. That it is proper to apply the
law and facts of such decisions to cases involving secondary school
students is demonstrated by Tinker's strong statement that ". . . it
can hardly be argued that... students ... shed their Constitutional
rights to freedom of expression at the schoolhouse gate."94 That it is
appropriate to apply decisions involving the right of adults to ex-
pression to cases involving secondary students is demonstrated by
the fact that the grounds of secondary schools are but a microcosm
of our society. Here, during the lunch hour and activity periods,
students intermingle with one another and bring into conflict the
clash of the same prejudices, beliefs, fears and hopes found in total
society.
The fictitious case of Dellinger v. Lemon County School Dis-
trict provides an illustration of the proposed approach-the applica-
tion of analogous Supreme Court decisions to cases involving students'
right to expression. During the lunch hour of October 32, 1970,
Rennie Dellinger spoke to a group of his classmates sitting on the
senior lawn. Rennie denounced the school board's policy of inviting
army recruiters to address school assemblies. Rennie pointed out
that representatives of the Committee to Combat Facism were
refused permission to enter the campus to offer draft counseling
services. Rennie then led his classmates in a chorus of "Alice's Res-
taurant" and chants of "One, two, three, four-we don't want your
bloody war." At this point, the principal appeared and suspended
91 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966).
92 Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969).
93 Id. at 513
94 Id. at 506.
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Rennie for his "immature, outrageous, boisterous and disorderly
conduct." Thereafter, Rennie brought suit to enjoin enforcement of
the principal's action.
The court, citing Tinker, said that the right to expression is
protected even on the school grounds. Dellinger then addressed it-
self to the issue of whether Rennie's expressive conduct was pro-
tected speech. The court rejected Lemon County's contention that
Rennie's conduct, by its boisterous nature, was substantially disrup-
tive of the peaceful atmosphere of the school. In rendering its deci-
sion, Dellinger relied on Cox v. Louisiana9 5 where the Supreme
Court overturned the conviction of the petitioner's breach of the
peace. As Cox denounced the existence of discrimination in the com-
munity of Baton Rouge, Rennie Dellinger denounced an existing
condition in the community of his school. As Cox loudly expressed
his discontent by speaking and leading a large crowd in singing,
Rennie Dellinger expressed his discontent by speaking and leading
a large crowd in singing and chanting. The court concluded that as
Cox's conduct did not constitutionally disturb the peace of Baton
Rouge, Louisania, neither then did Rennie Dellinger's conduct cause
substantial disruption of the order of his high school community.
The proposed approach is certainly not an elixir for utopia in
the schools, for it addresses itself solely to the problem of expression
in the schools. And, indeed, full judicial protection of first amend-
ment rights will undoubtedly lead to increased unrest in the schools.
However, as Tinker points out: "Tolerance of the unrest intrinsic
to the expression of controversial ideas is Constitutionally required
even in the schools."96 And, as Mr. Justice Douglas stated in Termi-
nello v. City of Chicago: 7
A function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. It may best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition
of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even
stirs people to anger. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions
and have profound unsettling effects as its presses for acceptance of
an idea.98
Certainly, "[o]ur history says that it is this sort of hazardous free-
dom-this kind of openness-that is the basis of our national
strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow
up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputative society."99
95 379 U.S. 536 (1966).
96 Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
97 379 U.S. 536 (1966).
98 Id.




By judicial recognition and adherence to the implications of
Tinker-that in the schools symbolic expression enjoys virtual ab-
solute protection and that outside the classroom area other forms
of expression are protected to the same extent as adult expression-
the iron door, unlocked by Barnette and Tinker, will swing open to
full judicial protection of the secondary student's constitutional
rights. Those administrators who seek a sterile school environment
and who rely on an unspoken conspiracy with like minded jurists
to accomplish this goal will be frustrated in their efforts. Instead,
those who long for the serenity of yesterday in the midst of the
turmoil of today will be compelled to offer an atmosphere where the
robust exchange of views, necessary in a free and progressive soci-
ety, thrives.
Here in an environment where his beliefs and values are chal-
enged by the constant interplay of ideas, the student will be truly
able to explore and discover himself and the society in which he
lives. Here, where unpopular expression is tolerated, the student
will be able and encouraged to express his social, political and eco-
nomic frustrations in a responsible manner-a manner which will,
hopefully, educate, not only others, but the student himself. And,
here, the practice of the first amendment will be consistent with its
theory and spirit.
Gerald F. Sevier*
* The author is a third year student at the University of Santa Clara School of
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